Abstract: Electronic marketplaces (e-marketplaces) allow networks of buyers and sellers to conduct business online and to exchange information more efficiently using Internet technology. Despite the benefits that e-marketplaces potentially afford firms, concerns have been raised that these markets may damage competition. This study considers the antitrust or competition legislation related to e-marketplaces and examines the possible competition concerns they raise. Potentially anticompetitive features of e-marketplaces are examined and guidance for firm conduct when creating or participating in an e-marketplace is offered.
Introduction
Internet technology has significantly changed the ways in which firms collaborate and compete. One such development as to how firms cooperate within business-to-business markets is provided by electronic marketplaces (e-marketplaces). E-marketplaces -sometimes referred to as e-hubs, businesst-to-business (B2B), or online exchanges -allow networks of buyers and sellers to conduct business online and to exchange information related to the terms and conditions of trade (Varadarajan and Yadav, 2002; de Boer et al. 2002) . This study provides a discussion of the competition policy implications of this increasingly important form of commerce.
By trading through portals such as 'SupplyOn' (an online marketplace for tierone and -two automotive suppliers) firms and industries can potentially benefit from reduced buyer/supplier search costs, improved communications between buyers and sellers and the improved flow of goods through the supply chain.
During the 1990s, e-marketplaces grew rapidly from a handful of websites in sectors such as chemicals and metals to some 750 e-marketplaces in 2000 (Brunelli, 1999; The Economist, 2000) . It is currently estimated that in excess of 1000 e-marketplaces are in operation (eMarket Services, 2007) , having now gained broad acceptance in most industries (Howard et al. 2005) . For example, Volkswagen Group's e-marketplace 'VWgroupsupply.com' handles 90% of their global purchasing volume, including all automotive parts, indirect materials and components amounting to US $77 billion annually -more than 70% of the Group's annual revenue.
Despite the benefits of trading via e-marketplaces, concerns persist that the characteristics of some electronic marketplaces might damage competition and consequently be construed as anticompetitive (Fontenot and Hyman, 2004) . Discussion of this issue is important as while several articles have adopted a legal perspective when discussing e-marketplaces (Dajani, 2001; Bailey, 2001; Sterling, 2001; Horton and Schmitz, 2002; Laflamme and Biggio, 2001 ), limited attention has been dedicated to comprehending the potential competition policy threats e-marketplaces pose for the industrial marketer (Fontenot and Hyman, 2004; Lichtenthal and Eliaz, 2003) .
Understanding the competition policy issues that e-marketplaces pose goes beyond assisting industrial marketers in avoiding potential legal pitfalls.
Identifying what constitutes a 'competitive' exchange is increasingly important as e-marketplaces are now a common platform for many B2B transactions.
Subsequently, addressing potential competition issues ensures a level playing field for all participants and alleviates many of the concerns of parties (such as suppliers) participating in e-marketplaces. In general, competition law is important for marketers to comprehend when new technologies afford firms greater opportunities to collaborate.
Within this study, after a brief review of the definition, benefits and perceived drawbacks of e-marketplaces, the potentially anti-competitive concerns are identified and linked with practical remedies. As US competition or antitrust law governing B2B e-marketplaces falls under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, our assessment is based on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) interpretation of US antitrust law. This jurisdiction is adopted for this assessment due to the relatively developed regulatory discussion of competition policy concerns with e-marketplaces in the USA.
Business-to-business electronic marketplaces -a background

Definition of e-marketplaces
While research regarding e-marketplaces is still at a formative stage, considerable interest concerning their role in supply chain management has been generated (e.g. Howard et al. 2005; Ordanini et al. 2004; Eng, 2004; Skjøtt-Larsen et al. 2003; Lancioni et al. 2003a , Lancioni et al. 2003b Goldsby and Eckert, 2003; Presutti, 2003; Garcia-Dastugue and Lambert, 2003; Sharma, 2002; Dou and Chou, 2002; Deeter-Schmelz and Norman Kennedy, 2002) . In particular, e-marketplaces have gained widespread acceptance across numerous business-to-business markets (Eng, 2004) as a means to allow networks of buyers and sellers to conduct business online and to exchange information more efficiently (Varadarajan and Yadav, 2002; IBM et al, 2000) . E-marketplaces provide firms with a common platform for interactive transactions and collaboration between buyers and sellers. E-marketplaces are usually sponsored by one party or a small number of parties (referred to as 'market makers') with the sole purpose of drawing together buyers and sellers in a particular sector (Grewal et al. 2001; Klein and Quelch, 1997) . For example, the web-based trading systems 'Converge' -a global marketplace for semiconductor and computer peripheral industries -has 6,500 trading partners in 139 countries ('www.converge.com'), or 'RF Globalnet' -a marketplace for microwave subsystems and components -has in excess of 3,000 suppliers listed ('www.rfglobalnet.com').
Ownership structure of e-marketplaces varies and includes private ownership (e.g. 'VWgroupsupply.com' operated by the Volkswagen Group), third-party ownership through a number of non-competing/independent firms (e.g. 'SupplyOn' operated by a number of German automotive suppliers), and consortia between competing firms sponsoring an exchange (e.g. the automotive marketplace 'Covisint' in its original guise). 
Proposed benefit
Author(s) Collaboration between buyers and sellers including product design and supply chain management. Howard et al. (2005); IBM et al. (2000) ; Kalyanam and McIntyre (2002); FTC (2000) . Online real time functionality (including online auctions and negotiations).
McKenna (1997); IBM et al. (2000) . Aggregated industry information (including product information) and industry news.
IBM et al. (2000).
Facilitation of relationship development and cooperation. Lancastre and Lages (2002) ; Barratt and Rosdahl (2002); FTC (2000) . Reduced buyer/supplier search costs; better informed decision-making. Bakos (1997); Bakos (1991); FTC (2000) . Improved communications and information sharing between buyers and sellers.
Eng (2004).
More efficient movement of goods through the supply chain. Eng (2004); FTC (2000) .
Reduce risk by quickly identifying new suppliers if problems arise.
de Boer et al. (2002) .
Creation of a level playing field for both small and large Eng (2004) .
firms. New market creation; joint purchasing efficiencies; increased efficiency through systems integration; assisting comparison between suppliers and their offerings; providing a 'middleman' function that otherwise lacks credibility; reduced maverick purchasing/unauthorised spending and facilitating online auctions; reduced administrative costs and errors; reduced 'exception handling'; managing international sales.
FTC (2000).
Benefits of e-marketplaces
Potential cost savings are the most obvious benefit of e-marketplaces. The average cost of a face-to-face sales call in the chemicals and pharmaceuticals sector is estimated to be $575, whereas the same transaction is thought to cost around $10 through an e-marketplace. Similarly, for small-to mediumsized enterprises (SMEs), a typical 'paper' transaction/purchase order that might cost $100 could potentially be reduced to $10 conducted via an emarketplace (FTC, 2000) . As well as financial rewards, many other advantages of e-marketplaces have been widely touted; a selection of these benefits is summarised in Figure 1 . In summary, e-marketplaces offer firms a forum to potentially collaborate more effectively and efficiently than previously (Skjøtt-Larsen et al. 2003; Eng, 2004) .
Potential drawbacks to e-marketplace participation
Although firms can gain considerably from e-marketplace participation, potential drawbacks exist. Such problems include technological compatibility, perceived risks, trust concerns, attracting market participants, legal issues and some initial supplier resistance. Many legacy systems or a low level of business automation are not well matched to the technological demands of emarketplaces (Eng, 2004; FTC, 2000) . Furthermore, many managers perceive moving from an established distribution channel to an electronic market to be a high risk option (Kaplan and Sawhney, 2000) . Within many firms trust concerns also arise if non-standard items are traded (Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002) . Similarly, some firms are reluctant to enter an e-marketplace if certain other competitors do not participate (Kaplan and Sawhney, 2000) . Indeed, motivations for joining exchanges differ markedly for buyers and suppliers (Barratt and Rosdahl, 2002 Developing the discussion of legal concerns, when e-marketplaces were first introduced many commentators considered it only a matter of time before they would be penalised for competition law infringements (Abrams, 2000; Labaton, 2000 To date, the competition policy issues pertinent to e-marketplaces have been considered to some degree chiefly by lawyers, or else from a legal perspective (Dajani, 2001; Bailey, 2001; Sterling, 2001; Horton and Schmitz, 2002; Laflamme and Biggio, 2001) . In comparison, studies dedicated to an industrial marketing audience highlighting pertinent competition policy issues related to e-marketplaces are largely absent (Fontenot and Hyman, 2004; Lichtenthal and Eliaz, 2003) . Although marketers are increasingly confronted by a number of legal and regulatory challenges (Petty, 2005) a general criticism of marketing practice and theory maintains that marketers have been perceived to be reluctant to engage in policy discussions (Czinkota, 2000) .
The scope of government policy and law which regulates marketing activity has expanded significantly in most developed nations (Le Clair 2000; Petty 1999 Petty , 2005 . Indeed, a number of authors (Le Clair et al. 1997; Gundlach and Phillips, 2002; Fontenot and Hyman, 2004) have recently identified that US antitrust or competition law presents a significant challenge to forms of marketing.
Ascertaining the dimensions of these regulatory concerns therefore is important for marketing managers. Indeed, many marketing managers may not realise the growing likelihood of violating antitrust or competition laws (Bush and Gelb, 2005) with many business crimes caused by employees who often unknowingly break the law pursuing firms' objectives (Le Clair, 2000) . 
3.
Competition Policy concerns and e-marketplaces: Generic challenges and implications for practitioners Despite the reported benefits of e-marketplaces, concerns have been raised that they enable collaboration and potentially restrict competition between buyers and suppliers. The competitive concerns of regulatory agencies toward e-marketplaces relate to two areas (FTC, 2000; FTC/DOJ, 2000) . Initially, concerns arise with the characteristics of e-marketplaces including how information is shared between firms, misuses of buyer power (or monopsony) and the potential exclusion or over-inclusion of firms from exchanges.
Additionally, the actual market for e-marketplaces may pose questions of competitiveness. This issue is exacerbated following the consolidation of some e-marketplaces such as 'CPGMarket', 'Pantellos' and 'TradeRanger' (McBride, 2005) . The dimensions of these anticompetitive concerns are considered in turn and are illustrated by an examination of 116 emarketplaces across five broad industrial markets spanning electronics and electrical products to science and engineering goods and services (see Appendix).
Markets for goods bought and sold on e-marketplaces
Information sharing
The premise of the Internet is a means to exchange information more easily and at higher speeds. E-marketplaces subsequently have the capacity to facilitate increased data sharing over the Web and improve the quality of information available to both buyers and sellers. This offers clear benefits as e-marketplaces allow real-time access to information such as product availability, prices and other competitive terms. While greater information availability will be likely to encourage competition and benefit markets "…information-sharing agreements in the context of B2Bs [e-marketplaces] could facilitate coordination on price or other competitive terms and thereby be likely to injure competition" (FTC, 2000, part 3, p.3) . This position is problematic as the distribution of information to firms which are traditionally competitors is an important precursor to full participation in an e-marketplace (Eng, 2004) . A critical element when assessing how information is assembled and used within e-marketplaces is the ownership and/or control of these entities.
Competitive concerns are likely to arise when e-marketplace owners who participate in the market fail to share sensitive information appropriately. Emarketplaces owned by a small number of powerful firms could use this transactional information (e.g. price and quantity data) to adjust their own marketing/pricing strategies gaining a competitive advantage. Strategic and price transparencies may then occur as participants in an e-marketplace can see how and why other firms are pricing their products. For example, Covisint caused concern among automotive suppliers and the FTC, as initially the major equity holders were a combination of major automotive manufacturers.
Subsequently, concerns were raised that these buyers might use this access to information opportunistically (Koch, 2002a, b) . Lastly, many e-marketplaces will generate and often sell aggregated information of transactions data for marketing purposes. This often important income generation opportunity for emarketplaces also poses substantial competition policy concerns.
Reducing the negative impact of information sharing
All e-marketplaces act as intermediary bodies and should be responsible for collating and disseminating information to market participants. The process of the distribution or sharing of information and its security concerns managers most when participating in e-marketplaces (Zhu, 2004; Kehng and AlHawamdeh, 2002; Forrester Research, 2000) . Firms are wary of creating 'over' transparency via e-marketplaces as there are risks in exchanging strategic information with other companies. However, when using emarketplaces companies often need to provide sensitive information such as prices, volume and procurement needs which could be used unscrupulously.
Although the FTC/DOJ (2000) guidelines require 'safeguards' to be put in place to limit some parties' access to sensitive information, they fall short of suggesting what would be appropriate to industrial marketers.
Given that site security is a major concern of e-marketplace participants, it was unsurprising that our examination of B2B e-marketplaces (see Appendix) indicated that the majority of sites (55%) emphasised information security protocols, often citing specific security devices utilised to protect data captured (e.g. firewalls, secure socket layer, encryption devices), including certification for secure information handling in the case of one site (SupplyOn). In terms of how data were used and disseminated by marketplaces, 23% of exchanges claimed not to share information with any other party, instead using it only for site purposes; 13% only shared information to third parties if consent was given; whilst 46% used information captured on transactions for marketing purposes (typically targeting offers to site participants). In the case of 18% of sites, no criteria were disclosed (or else were unavailable) concerning how information was used.
A small minority of exchanges had some form of competition law or ethical guidelines available for participants to consult (5%); 3% of sites employed safeguards controlling the information accessible to employees and board members; and 6% of exchanges had a privacy or compliance officer. Finally, of the sites examined, less than half (43.9%) emphasised their independence/neutrality or else made no mention of a particular bias. Only in the case of a small minority of sites (3%) was a bias declared and then this was directed towards the supply side, with no obvious buy side bias among the sites sampled. Based on the sites examined: i.
A sizeable proportion of exchanges (45%) made little or no mention of site security;
ii.
The bulk of exchanges intended to use participants' transaction information for marketing purposes including third party usage;
iii. Few sites provided ethical guidelines or referred specifically to antitrust or competition law; and iv. Despite the majority of sites sampled being open to all credible buyers and suppliers within a particular industry (and comprising third-party owned exchanges), less than half emphasised their neutrality.
To reduce the possibility of the unscrupulous use of information, emarketplaces and participating firms need to control the flow of information both horizontally (between competitors) and vertically (both upstream and downstream in the supply chain) (Dajani, 2001) , and need this to be emphasised to participants. This control is particularly important when one party does not know the identity of the prospective buyer or supplier. A number of approaches are used to achieve this regulation of information use, including the ownership of e-marketplaces, curbs on personnel using sensitive information, the use of legal resources and internet security. Joining a neutral market or exchange which is not owned by either buyers or suppliers is an initial step in reducing these informational concerns. For example, VertMarkets specialises in e-marketplaces operating some 68 sites spanning electronics markets to the public sector. As VertMarkets are not owned by either buyers or suppliers in their focal markets they are seen as being independent particularly if they carefully manage the data captured from their sites. Within a neutral market data on transactions and other business captured from the site are controlled by an independent third party.
Subsequently, access to competitively sensitive information can be limited to specific personnel which can be bound by confidentiality/non-disclosure agreements outlining who will have access to data. Confidentiality agreements should also include persons working for an exchange on temporary assignment from a participating firm. Since its inception, FreeMarkets, an electronic marketplace for a diverse range of hi-tech and pharmaceutical goods, has used non-disclosure agreements. Similarly
MetalSite, a marketplace for steel, provided its employees with antitrust or competition law training and required them to sign confidentiality agreements (FTC, 2000) . Further, engaging an antitrust or competition lawyer at board meetings and to periodically audit e-marketplace participant behaviour would also help ensure that these conditions are upheld.
Ensuring the physical security of the information systems adopted is a logical step in limiting unauthorised access to e-marketplace data. It is often pertinent for the software underpinning an exchange to be designed by an independent agency. Such an impartial body can monitor who has access to the software, including access codes and user recognition software that could potentially identify participants. Further, the use of firewalls and other methods of physically limiting unauthorised access to sensitive information are also important, with some marketplaces being early adopters of this technology.
For example, SupplyOn was one of the first marketplaces to gain independent certification for their information security management system (BS 7799-2 and ISO 27001) as well as committing to independent monthly and annual security and risk audits. Clear operating guidelines should also help reduce suppliers' fears in participating. VW's private GroupSupply exchange emphasises to suppliers that sensitive data are only exchanged between the supplier and VW, thus greatly reducing transparency and potential standardisation issues.
Similarly, SupplyOn state their exchange should:
i.
Handle customer data with high confidentiality and integrity;
Meet the highest security standards in all company departments;
iii. Secure long term business operations of SupplyOn; and iv. Minimise the risks of human failure or abuse.
Source: SupplyOn.com.
Managers also need to be aware that many e-marketplaces' aggregate data that will be distributed to members or sold to third parties in order to increase site income. This is particularly the case for third-party owned industrial marketplaces. For example PartMiner, a major exchange for electronic components, like most of its contemporaries reserves the right to use aggregate data for sales or marketing purposes. How these aggregated data are treated and disseminated is a potential competition policy concern.
Although no specific business-to-business guidelines exist, the joint FTC/DOJ antitrust principles for disseminating competitor data provides useful guidance for the management of e-marketplace aggregated data, stipulating that:
A third party manages the survey;
ii. The information collected is more than three months old;
iii.
A minimum of five companies reported the data;
iv.
No individual company accounts for more than 25% of the data; and v. The information reported is anonymous. ISM, 2005) . Figure 2 highlights the major of areas of concern and outlines remedies for information sharing.
Monopsony -misuses of buyer power
Competition law originally developed to curb the influence of powerful sellers who restricted competition and had the ability to increase prices to consumers (Kirkwood, 2004) . Similar concerns latterly arose based on the emergence of large, powerful buyers that had the potential to restrict competition, through 'monopsonistic behaviour'. These 'oligopsony' concerns occur when powerful buyers with a significant share of the buying market collude to influence prices or other terms of exchange. For example, larger buyers participating in an emarketplace might derive better prices through volume discounts. Also when buyers are relatively few in number and interact frequently the potential for collusion exists (Tyagi, 2001 that a defendant's behaviour was likely to reduce rather than increase consumer welfare (Kirkwood, 2004) .
Not all e-marketplaces allow joint purchasing. Where joint purchasing is prohibited buyers might circumvent such site rules and co-ordinate their buying with other firms via an agent (FTC, 2000) . Although buyers participating in an e-marketplace might derive better prices through volume discounts, instances where participants have agreed to purchase exclusively through the exchange could also increase instances of opportunistic monopsony power being exercised. Buyer power could also be exercised through reverse auctions. In the case of Covisint (created by large automotive firms) many suppliers considered reverse online auctions -a key feature of the exchange -as a market test for the buyer. Suppliers felt that these motives accounted for as much as 80% of reverse auctions held on the site (Hannon, 2003) leading to its initial rejection by some suppliers (Hannon, 2004) who were concerned that they would be forced to acquiesce to the demands of powerful buyers. In comparison, SupplyOn was created by major German automotive suppliers (including Robert Bosch and Continental) in an attempt to deflect the power of large buyers.
Reducing the negative impact of monopsony
The major monopsony concerns of policy makers and managers include joint purchasing arrangements, the 'standardisation' of terms of trade, and reverse auctions. Our examination of active e-marketplaces revealed no information pertaining to joint purchasing rules or volume agreements for any of the sites sampled. In terms of online auctions, although 25% of sites held auctions, only 9% featured reverse auctions. Only in the case of three exchanges (2.5% of sites) did they specifically note the use of identity tracking software.
Although some sites will inevitably be owned by the buying side, many exchanges emphasised their independence/neutrality or else made no mention of a particular bias as noted earlier.
In terms of practical remedies, for joint purchasing, it is advisable for emarkets to attempt to prohibit the practice. Such steps will hopefully make the facilitation of price fixing more complex and reduce the apprehension of suppliers. This line was taken by the founders of Covisint who stipulated in their initial operating guidelines that:
[Covisint] Will not aggregate the purchases of one firm with those of another;
Will not offer aggregated purchasing services for any automotivespecific parts or materials; and
iii. Aggregated purchases of non-automotive specific parts (such as office supplies, cleaning suppliers etc.) will always be within the applicable competitive law guidelines in which the purchases are made.
Source: Covisint website (Dajani, 2001 ).
Although buyers may use joint purchasing to lower prices, potentially raising antitrust and competition concerns (Barratt and Rosdahl, 2002) , it is not per se illegal with two 'safe harbours' existing for companies participating in e- Other practical measures could include: limiting purchases made by participants under joint agreements or by using quotas, monitoring the market share of the buying group, and restricting the number of participants involved in joint purchases. In the case of reverse auctions -where buyers might be able to manipulate proceedings -e-marketplaces may use controls. These controls include identity software to ensure that false bidding by buyers does not take place (a practice referred to by practitioners as 'shilling') and that the result of the auction is honoured in order to avoid 'market tests' by some unscrupulous buyers. Although some exchanges may be tempted to prohibit reverse auctions outright, they might be inadvertently limiting suppliers' greater exposure to potential buyers. 
Competition warning signs Remedies
The extent to which a buyer or a group of buyers can feasibly coordinate activities to dominate a market with the intent to lower prices (via joint purchasing, reverse auctions etc.).
A high proportion of joint purchasing initiatives particularly by dominant buyers.
Unexplainably low prices in comparison to rival exchanges and off-line markets.
Suppliers complain to antitrust or competition law agencies about the extent of buyer coercion.
The site is predominantly owned by dominant buyers.
Prohibit joint purchasing.
If joint purchasing is to be permitted then follow FTC/DOJ 'safe harbour' guidelines. Through prohibiting additional firms participating in joint purchases beyond specified thresholds, and/or by using a quota system.
Employ identity software to track participants involved in reverse auctions and to ensure that false bidding by dominant buyers does not take place.
Monitor the market share of participating buyers.
The concerns related to 'standardisation' are likely to be unfounded for the majority of firms participating in e-marketplaces. Most industrial markets deal in non-standardised products and components (such as is the case in the automotive, semiconductor and aerospace markets) making the standardisation of the terms of trade highly problematic based on firms with unique offerings. Further, most companies prefer establishing relationships with suppliers and operate under a 'total cost' situation, where price is one of a number of important criteria along with other factors such as augmented services or order cycle time (Lichtenthal and Eliaz, 2003) , therefore making standardisation unlikely. When concerns persist, however, the standardisation of terms can be reduced by adopting some of the previously discussed guidance for information sharing in order to reduce the dissemination of commercially sensitive information. Figure 3 highlights the major areas of monopsony concern and potential remedies.
Exclusion/over inclusion of new participants
While most e-marketplaces are open to all who qualify as buyers or suppliers, in some cases membership can be prohibited for other than appropriate reasons (such as poor credit history or abuse of the sites' terms and conditions). Similarly, firms may be coerced into using certain e-marketplaces rather than an exchange of their choosing. Antitrust and competition legislation such as the Sherman Act views such exclusion from, or over inclusion in, a market as a concern when this damages competition rather than individual competitors (FTC, 2000) . Damage to competition must clearly be demonstrable including the extent of the disadvantage that firms experience by being excluded or having limited access to a marketplace.
Competiton concerns also arise with the 'over inclusion' of firms in an emarketplace by persuading or compelling firms to use an exchange to the exclusion of other marketplaces (FTC, 2000) .
These issues of competitor exclusion can occur when a select group of firms (including e-marketplace owner-participants) wishes to create more integrated and synchronised operations (Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002) . Such a consortium of owner-participants might involve a small circle of powerful buyers and/or sellers, each with an equal interest in preserving the status quo which affords participants favourable treatment through entry barriers or reduced costs (Fontenot and Hyman, 2004) . For example, if an e-marketplace leads to the realisation of considerable efficiencies, the participant-owners could refuse or limit access to their competitors (FTC, 2000) .
In some instances the operating rules of the e-marketplace may limit participants' access to other competing exchanges. For example, emarketplace owner-participants might be forbidden from using or investing in rival exchanges or be required to conduct a specified quantity of their business through the exchange (Laflamme and Biggio, 2001) . If this leads to powerful buyers concentrating most of their purchasing through a particular exchange it may harm competition, leaving little business for competing exchanges. In this situation, a rival exchange may find it impossible to compete with the incumbent e-marketplace for the sector (Laflamme and Biggio, 2001 ). The damaging effects of exclusion are likely to be greatest
where an e-marketplace is important for developing competition in an industry, leading to a situation where competition can be adversely affected by exclusion. The damage to excluded parties might include rebates of fees unavailable to participants' rivals, information presented in a manner that benefits the owners of the e-marketplace, and disadvantageous access to owners' rivals that could ultimately raise the costs incurred by competitors excluded from the marketplace (FTC, 2000) . Discrimination by e-marketplace owners/founders may restrict market entry to existing and new competitors reducing opportunities particularly for smaller suppliers.
Reducing the negative impact of exclusion/over inclusion of new participants
As noted, the major issues concerning exclusion/over inclusion for emarketplaces relate to the prohibition of membership and use of rival exchanges. Based on the e-marketplaces examined, the results indicate that numerous independent exchanges operate in markets where negligible switching costs apply. 90 of the e-marketplaces examined (78% of sites) allowed buyers and suppliers to join by completion of an (often brief) online registration form; 24 exchanges (21%) stipulated some form of qualification (e.g. creditworthiness, quality/reliability), or required either the buyer or supplier to be based in a particular country; while two exchanges did not disclose any membership criteria. In terms of costs, 53 marketplaces (46% of sites) charged variable fees based on services used, 16 sites (14%) charged a time-based fee (either annually, quarterly or monthly), 12 sites (10%) were free, with the remainder levying a charge to either the supplier (22 sites, 19%) or buyer (nine sites, 8%). Five sites offered trial periods (in some cases this incurred a minimal charge) while four sites did not disclose their fees. Based on the e-marketplaces examined, the evidence indicated that: Covisint, however, adopted an inclusive attitude encouraging membership among other automotive firms and suppliers, although some manufacturers decided to create their own e-marketplace as was the case with the Volkswagen Group and 'GroupSupply'.
Despite these concerns, the exclusion of firms from an e-marketplace on the grounds of being a competitor seems unlikely as many exchanges are independent and operate with a profit motive. To date, no marketplace has developed an unassailable position with in excess of 1000 independent exchanges in existence serving most industries (eMarket Services, 2007) .
Under such conditions exclusion of potential users would ultimately be selfdefeating. Reducing the number of suppliers participating allows buyers temporarily to negotiate lower prices, yet limits buyer choice over time.
Conversely, restricting potential buyers might cause suppliers to defect to rival 
Competition warning signs Remedies
Firms are excluded from an emarketplace.
Large market share of participants.
Potential trading partners are excluded from e-marketplaces for reasons other than poor credit history or relevant qualifications.
Allow participants to invest in, or trade via, other marketplaces thus demonstrating a procompetitive and inclusive attitude. Firms are compelled or coerced into using one marketplace by volume agreements, or other means.
Volume agreements lead to concentrated purchasing by dominant firms.
Firms complain to antitrust or competition agencies that they are being disadvantaged by being excluded, or else, having limited access to a marketplace.
Eliminate volume agreements.
Ensure ease of membership unless justified (e.g. 'qualified sellers', specialist defence systems, or excluding 'free riding' by non-owner members).
The market for e-marketplaces
The final e-marketplace antitrust or competition policy concern is the market for, and the level of competition between, e-marketplaces (FTC, 2000) . The FTC has expressed concerns that the development of B2B e-marketplaces and services might undermine the level of competition for e-marketplace creation. The level of competition for e-marketplaces will be affected by the scale of 'network effects' which exist when "…the value of a product to one user depends on how many other users there are" (Shapiro and Varian, 1999, p.13) . For example, new exchanges created within an industry by existing players will have a first-mover advantage and potentially considerable network effects as firms are often attracted to larger networks.
An exchange that creates a lead in a sector -through technical or marketing reasons -may draw in enough firms establishing itself as the 'market maker' for the sector. Such a marketplace could exert a powerful effect on competition between e-marketplaces with buyers or sellers encouraged to deal with this particular exchange excluding others. This could be facilitated through incentives such as rebates or revenue sharing, or rules such as minimum volume requirements or prohibitions on investment in other emarketplaces (FTC, 2000) . These conditions amount to switching costs providing both benefits of membership and potential penalties that can lock participants de facto into the exchange. Similarly, when a group of firms in a network invest resources to integrate new technology and operations, participants become dependent and find exit problematic (Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002) . This behaviour undermines market competition and the development of alternative marketplaces, leading to higher prices, less efficient service, and reduced innovation due to complacency (FTC, 2000) .
Under section 3 of the Clayton Act, agreements between firms to not use or deal in the goods of competitors are prohibited. Similarly, under the Sherman Act, regulatory agencies might view such behaviour as tantamount to a 'group boycott', or to refusal to deal with firms excluded from a dominant emarketplace.
Reducing the negative impact in the market for e-marketplaces
The expectation that exchanges would have negative network effects has not manifested as anticipated with more than 1000 independent exchanges in operation (see Table 1 ). Subsequently, concerns as to the exclusivity of exchanges appear unfounded. In terms of the sites examined, no e-marketplace could be identified that stipulated participants could not engage in trade with other sites (with suppliers allowed to post multiple offers on competing sites), although the extent of interoperability between sites was unclear. If an exchange intends not to admit all competitors for some reason then it might be seen to violate antitrust or competition law (Dajani, 2001) . The evidence highlighted above suggests that this is not likely to be the case. Even for private exchanges such as VWGroupSupply, although Volkswagen handles 90% of their global purchasing volume via the exchange, their market share in 2006 -at less than 4% of the US market and 11% of the European market -is unlikely to trouble US or European competition authorities. Figure 5 summarises the major areas of concern and suggests remedies. Incentives/minimum volume requirements.
Allow suppliers to post multiple offers on competing sites and do not prohibit parties from using rival exchanges.
Minimise volume agreements. Barriers exist (natural or artificial) to preclude firms' participating in rival exchanges.
Participants prohibited from using rival exchanges (firms are excluded from freely selecting a trading partner).
Minimise switching costs and entry barriers.
E-marketplaces and competition policy -tentative conclusions
Historically, the assessment of latest developments in government policy and law for marketing practice was a prominent topic within the marketing literature (e.g. Engle, 1936 , Nystrom 1936 , McNair 1938 , Edwards 1950 .
Despite the importance previously placed on legal and regulatory concerns, the legality of marketing actions has attracted less attention in recent years (Czinkota, 2000) . This decline, associated with the changing perception of marketing to being solely an organisational function (Petty, 2005) , has not been associated with any decline in the importance of government policy and legislation. Conversely, the scope of government policy and law which regulates marketing activity has expanded significantly in most developed nations (Gundlach and Phillips, 2002; Le Clair 2000; Petty 1999 Petty , 2005 ). In the current context, e-marketplaces provide a platform that facilitates more efficient supply chain management and a means to forge relationships with a larger number of parties. As such, e-marketplaces are changing the mechanics of competition in most industries for the better by providing opportunities for increasing supply chain management efficiencies. However, whilst firms are being encouraged to build relationships that are hard for competitors to imitate or displace (Day, 2000) and to move towards 'co- The anticompetitive issues that relate to e-marketplaces are not unique in the sense that they are covered by existing legislation. They do, however, allow larger numbers of players to interact more effectively and potentially to collaborate than many existing technologies such as the telephone network.
Although a grey area currently exists concerning B2B e-marketplaces and legislation, with US Government Agencies such as the FTC and DOJ adopting a fairly liberal and supportive attitude, competition agencies will be quick to act if there is the possibility of competition law violations. As most developed countries have antitrust/competition legislation informed by the US model (Djelic, 2002) , the implications and issues discussed in this study including proposed conduct are generalised to other country contexts.
Online marketplaces are likely to benefit most markets by being procompetitive rather than reducing market competition. Their potential, however, to negatively impact on competition (and individual firms) is considerable. In particular, firms need to pay attention to governance structures, operating rules and procedures when creating and participating in e-marketplaces, and potential competition issues when new technologies afford competitors greater opportunities to collaborate.
Although most e-marketplaces will pose no anticompetitive concerns, their creation, maintenance and participation require firms' comprehension of competition guidelines. Consequently, practitioners would benefit from a range of future research. Initially, examining the creation of new emarketplaces can provide insights into the compliance procedures adopted prior to launch and in the marketing strategies adopted by new sites. (14) 4 (3) 5 (4) *Sites included are third-party owned (i.e. non-competing/independent firms) and excludes private exchanges. The sample comprises emarketplaces that are open to multiple buyers and suppliers and have at least one online trading function through which the e-marketplace itself does not buy or sell (Source: eMarket Services, 2007). **Information obtained from individual e-marketplaces' 'terms and conditions', 'privacy statement', and 'about us' sections as well as other relevant information posted on the site.
